In the invited talk on 04.12.2019 Prof. Marc Bourreau (Telecom ParisTech) gave an exciting talk on the current topic:
"Digital Platforms, Data, and Entry with Informational Spillovers"
Marc Bourreau is Professor of Economics at Telecom Paris (Institut Polytechnique de Paris), director of the Innovation & Regulation Chair at Telecom Paris, and a joint academic director of the Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE). He is also affiliated with the interdisciplinary institute for innovation (i3) for his research. His current research projects concern the economics of digital platforms, the impact of competition and regulation on entry and investment in network industries, and licensing and trading of standard essential patents. Website: http://ses-perso.telecom-paristech.fr/bourreau/
In this paper, we consider a market where a platform has private information about which product markets are profitable. Two independent sellers participate to the platform and decide sequentially which market to enter. We study under which conditions the platform benefits from selling its information exclusively to one seller rather than to any interested seller. We show that with or without exclusive sales, only the second-moving seller buys the data. This is because an informational externality undermines the first mover’s willingness to pay for data. Exclusive dealing is the preferred data monetization strategy for the platform if the relative value of operating as a monopoly seller in a profitable market is sufficiently high.